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Abstract 
This paper reviews parallel attacks on the ethical basis of liberal principles from within 
and without that tradition, one the Confucian-Kantian perspective of contemporary phi-
losopher Li Zehou 李澤厚 and the other the un-Kantian “post-liberalism” of John Gray. 
Both reject foundational claims regarding the universality of liberal values and principles 
while still affirming the universal value of those principles via their practical function in 
fostering for human flourishing. I point out that Gray’s anti-foundationalist liberalism 
not only aligns with the Confucian elements of Li Zehou’s theory, but may even be en-
riched by them.




Pričujoči članek vsebuje kritiko etične osnove liberalnih principov z dveh vidikov: od 
znotraj in od zunaj. Prvi obravnava konfucijansko-kantovsko perspektivo sodobnega 
filozofa Li Zehouja 李澤厚, drugi pa ne-kantovski »postliberalizem« Johna Graya. Ti-
sto, kar je skupno obema, je negacija osnovne ideje liberalnih vrednot in principov ter 
poudarjanje univerzalnih vrednot tistih načel, ki preko svojih praktičnih funkcij podpirajo 
družbene strukture, ki krepijo človeško blagostanje. Pri tem avtor poudari, da slednja teor-
ija ni samo skladna s konfucijanskimi elementi prve, temveč lahko te tudi obogati.
Ključne besede: Li Zehou, konfucijanska etika, konfucijanska politična filozofija, liberal-
izem, postliberalizem 
Introduction
A central issue in political theory today is whether and how it is possible to con-
struct and guide modern—most often understood as liberal, individualist, egal-
itarian, and capitalist—social institutions in ways that reflect and are supported 
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by the more traditional and particular values of the communities they govern. The 
demand for such cultural localism or particularization follows from the value of 
self-determination, collective and personal, often invoked in justification of mod-
ern liberal institutions—that people ought to (at least be able to) pursue lives and 
ways of life that they see as (most) worthwhile. Modern liberal ideology in this 
sense demands cultural particularity both practically and normatively: the func-
tioning and legitimacy of social and political institutions require (at least a certain 
degree of ) endorsement by those participating in and governed by them, and this 
can take place only in terms of values these citizens themselves hold. 
Yet while the value of self-determination seems to demand cultural particularism, 
the claims of modern liberal ideology are generally universalist, and the institu-
tional norms they promote—natural human rights, freedoms, and the values of 
self-determination and equality—construed as objective goods. They are goods in 
virtue of constituting the very terms on which (fair) self-determination is possible. 
Thus, particular cultural traditions can and should, or must, be expressed through 
modern liberal values and institutions, and these values and institutions are not 
to be breached in their expression. To alter these institutions in the name of par-
ticular traditions is then merely to compromise them, and so compromise the very 
terms of fair self-determination.
Thus, liberalism’s promotion of individualist democratic and capitalist institutions 
is axiologically founded on individual and collective self-determination, yet pro-
moting these institutions and values themselves requires heteronomously alter-
ing traditional cultural values and social structures that do not align with, and 
thus must to some extent be replaced by, democratic and capitalist values. There 
seems to be tension or conflict, then, internal to the theory and practice of liberal 
principles and institutions in their claim to promote fair self-determination. This 
tension is particularly acute in cultures for which the terms of modern liberal 
institutions and their underlying values are not native, but which in modern-
izing have formally adopted liberal institutions and norms as well as (partially) 
absorbed corresponding democratic and capitalist values. Sungmoon Kim, for ex-
ample, identifies this difficulty in liberal democratic South Korea, whose culture 
remains substantively Confucian in character, if not in name (Kim 2014, Ch. 9; 
2016, Ch. 3 and 4). Liberalism might thus be seen as promoting an ideology and 
set of institutions that stand opposed to cultural particularity and true self-deter-
mination, and which prove hegemonic to particular local cultural systems, tradi-
tions, and values. 
Liberalism, then, finds itself in a somewhat awkward position. Its defenders claim 
that it allows for self-determination through universal principles or prescriptions, 
and sometimes admit that it is itself a culturally particular view and does not as-
pire to universalism. Its detractors say that it hegemonizes other valuable ways of 
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life, and sometimes even that in doing so it replaces these with an impoverished 
ideology, largely empty of values. But whether all, some, or none of these views 
are correct, the fact remains that many societies now operate—socially, politically, 
and legally—through liberal democratic and capitalist systems yet retain substan-
tive traditional values at odds with the liberal values on which the functioning of 
these systems was designed. What to make of this and what is to be done about it 
are particularly poignant questions for comparative political philosophy, and they 
have received much attention in contemporary Confucian discourse, wherein the 
issue is most often posed as: What are traditional Confucian values to do in the 
face of modernization? As I have attempted to show above, an equally interesting 
question is: What is liberal theory to do in the face of Confucian values? Our 
answers depend on how we conceive of liberalism.
Below I review parallel attacks on the ethical basis of liberal principles from with-
in and without that tradition, one the Confucian-Kantian perspective of contem-
porary philosopher Li Zehou 李澤厚 and the other the non-Kantian “post-lib-
eralism” of John Gray, both of which reject foundational claims regarding the 
universality of liberal values and principles but which affirm the universal value 
of those principles via their practical function in supporting social structures that 
foster for human flourishing. Gray’s advocacy of post-liberalism is exceptional 
as a critique of liberal doctrine that is philosophically rather than politically or 
ideologically motivated, and even largely driven by liberal rather than anti-liberal 
commitments. As we will see, Gray, like Li, finds the diverse formulations of liber-
al theory proposed by liberal theorists incoherent or unpersuasive, and ultimately 
aims to affirm liberal principles on more solid grounds. I point out that his argu-
ments not only align with the Confucian elements of Li Zehou’s theory but may 
even be enriched by them. 
What’s Wrong with Liberalism?
Liberalism often presents itself as a universal doctrine, espousing objective princi-
ples of liberty or justice by which states ought to govern. This is, for example, how 
J. S. Mill presents his arguments in On Liberty. It more dramatically forms the core 
of Kantian arguments as epitomized, for example, in Kant’s various formulations 
of the categorical imperative, which is carried forward in contemporary successors 
such as John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1999) and especially Ronald Dworkin 
(2011), who likewise grounds liberal practices in objective ethical, moral, and po-
litical principles. These principles are understood as universally applicable to all 
people: since their normative force is generated by a generic conception of the 
human being, they have moral grip on each of us simply by virtue of our humanity. 
As Francis Fukuyama puts it, Kantian-Dworkinian normativity, for contemporary 
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liberals, “etches a bright red line around the whole of the human race” (Fukuyama 
2002, 150). Born from Christian and Kantian notions, modern liberalism affirms 
principles of government as timeless and universal morals of humanity itself.
Li Zehou denounces this dimension of liberalism, arguing that modern liberal 
principles and values are better understood as social norms historically particular 
to modern liberal culture. They are morals or rational imperatives produced by pe-
culiarly modern forms of reason, not derived from “reason” as such: “rational prin-
ciples or reason itself come from the living existence of humankind and are not a 
priori” (Li 2016, 1077). Li’s rejection of Kant’s a priori or pure reason aligns with 
a trend in Kantian ethical theory abandoning the transcendental or metaphysical 
dimensions of Kant’s thought, but is distinct from the corresponding tendency 
to shift from grounding morality in the faculty of reason toward a defence of the 
normative force of moral reasons (see, for example, Scanlon 2011). These views re-
place the universal and absolute faculty of pure reason with an equally ahistorical 
rational a priori moral principle, shifting the grounds of moral objectivity from the 
faculty of pure reason to a rational capacity to evaluate concrete reasons, governed 
by some absolute and unchanging moral principle. Li Zehou, in contrast, rejects 
the possibility of objective moral principle independent of concrete historical con-
ditions altogether.
A particularly important element of this difference between Li Zehou’s historicist 
Kantian theory and these forms of contemporary Kantianism is that while they 
follow Kant in formulating the a priori value of humans as ends as a rational and 
stateable principle of equality, Li reinterprets the principle of humans as ends as 
historically contingent, and decidedly not as a universal a priori truth (Li 2011, 
23–24; 2016, 1131; cf. Carleo 2020). On this basis, Li opposes “individual free-
dom or ... ‘justice’ being prioritized as supreme a priori or transcendental rational 
principles” as in Kant and Rawls (Li 2016, 1086). As historical products of con-
crete culture, the application of these principles should be evaluated in context 
and adjusted accordingly. They cannot serve as universal moral or political stand-
ards for all cultures.
These standards cannot be universal because human psychology and relations are 
not generic. Moral norms, in Li’s view, are not only applied to concrete human 
situations, they also arise from them. The emotion and reason that constitute mor-
al psychology are products of concrete, situated human experience and learning, 
and developed historically within human culture. As norms governing concrete 
human relations through human psychology, moral imperatives thus shift. (As 
an empirical observation, this is difficult to dispute; normatively, it presents a 
much-disputed form of moral relativity that is often theoretically formulated in 
ways that are intuitively and philosophically unsatisfactory. Li rejects such forms 
of relativism and attempts to formulate a more persuasive view that establishes 
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an objective basis for moral relativity, which we return to below.) In contrast, the 
reliance on generic conceptions of rational personhood in Kant, Rawls, Dworkin, 
and others in attempting to establish normative principles with universal grip, and 
Mill’s reliance on a combination of teleological development of individuality and 
a notoriously dubious form of welfarism, all rest on axiological assumptions that 
are not themselves, empirically speaking, universal, but rather came to prevalence 
historically with the rise of modern liberalism, rationalism, and individualism. 
Li’s position is attractive because it recognizes the historical particularity of that 
axiology while affirming its normative force for modern societies. 
That liberal principles are not universally rationally deducible in the manner that 
much liberal theory attempts to establish is a criticism Li shares with John Gray:
In general, it is one of the oldest aspirations of philosophers to formulate 
criteria or legislate norms of deliberative rationality which will be uni-
versal and context-independent in that they reflect the natural necessities 
of man’s life, and which (unlike the rules of inference of formal logic) 
will impose substantive restrictions on the conduct of practical reason-
ing. Notoriously, this perennial aspiration is open to the objection that 
the task of distinguishing between what is generic and what is specific 
in human life, between what is essential and what is accidental, between 
nature and convention, is (logically, or as a matter of fact) impossible to 
bring off. (Gray 1989, 34)
Gray’s formulation of the criticism here impugns Rawls’s reliance on generic 
goods, which Rawls calls primary social goods, as the basis for deriving princi-
ples of justice. These generic goods rely on a generic conception of human na-
ture—the kind of Aristotelian view that liberals such as Rawls and Dworkin share 
with critics such as Charles Taylor (Taylor 1985; cf. Kymlicka 1989, 894–96) and 
Alastair MacIntyre (1984). Gray contends that this view of human nature and 
correspondingly Rawls’s (or any) list of primary social goods are culturally de-
pendent,1 and argues—as Li Zehou does as well—“that human nature is always 
entirely constituted by a nexus of historically variant, culturally specific and al-
terable social relations” (Gray 1989, 35). Since people’s ways of life are therefore 
products of the circumstances and relations, along with the biological character, 
they are born into, therefore, “no conception of the good life can be privileged 
over others on the grounds that it is more deeply founded in man’s nature” (Gray 
1 “Rawls gives the derivation of the principles of justice from the circumstances of the original 
position an appearance of plausibility only by building into the deliberative rationality of the 
contractors’ normative specifications (such as that embodied in the Aristotelian principle) whose 
culture-dependency is patent.” (Gray 1989, 34)
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1989, 35). While this does not quite indict the Rawlsian view—since Rawls ar-
gues not that a particular conception of the good life is found in human nature, 
but that the primary social goods are generic because they are fundamental to the 
pursuit of any (individual’s) conception of the good life—it points toward a more 
fundamental objection endorsed by Li Zehou’s views. Since individual pursuit of 
the good life is informed and partly determined by the cultural and institutional 
conditions of society, the conditions for that pursuit will also shift. There are thus 
no unchangeable or generic primary goods; rather, all primary goods (as the con-
ditions for pursuit of the good life) will be particular to the concrete conditions of 
actual societies, including economic and political structures, cultural values, and 
social norms. 
Although Gray, like Li, is dissatisfied with the theoretical incoherence of liberal 
doctrine, and both decry the dogmatic and axiomatic way in which liberal val-
ues and principles are often invoked, Gray remains deeply committed to liberal 
practices. Li likewise celebrates the value of liberal principles and modernization 
generally in releasing people from more oppressive traditional social structures. 
He thus rejects the universal and a priori nature of the principle of humans as 
ends, but affirms that same principle as a historically particular value appropriate 
to contemporary society. 
Especially in terms of ethics, we cannot talk about society without con-
sidering the individual, and thus liberalism has made important contri-
butions to this area of human history. (Li 2016, 1123)
Clearly, many principles of liberalism do not arise from the theoretical 
suppositions of Kant and Rawls, but rather from social life and the ex-
perience of humankind. Kant and others abstract this as the universal 
certainty of a priori reason, innate human rights, and the atomic indi-
vidual. Even though such a standpoint is untenable, these ideas hugely 
elevate the position of humans and encourage people to work hard to 
realize certain ideals, which has positive effects on history and in actual 
life. (ibid., 1121)
[L]iberal individual freedom and value neutrality ... are in fact press-
ing necessities for many nations in breaking free from the economic and 
political manifestations of their traditional societies (such as primitive 
tribalism, slavery, and serfdom, as well as religious and cultural autocracy 
and privilege). Value neutrality, prioritization of rights, and individual 
freedom are ... strongly needed for social development by certain coun-
tries and regions. (ibid., 1128)
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That is, the value or authority of liberal principles is not universal but pragmatic 
and particular, based in its function within social systems in improving the condi-
tions of individual and collective human life. 
Concepts of justice associated with liberalism are the basic principles 
of modern social morals. People follow them not because they are the 
products of a particular thinker, but rather because these notions have the 
support of economic forces. These economic forces have taken abstractly 
conceived concepts like ‘the atomic individual’ and ‘natural human rights’ 
and seemingly actualized them, making the independent individual, the 
social contract, and public reason increasingly part of institutional order, 
behavioral norms, and moral standards. (Li 2016, 1085)
Li further argues, on the basis of the beneficial function of liberal norms in mod-
ern society, that while many communitarian arguments share his dissatisfaction 
with liberalism’s claims to universality (so that, “Theoretically speaking, commu-
nitarianism makes a good point”), on a practical level communitarians merely 
obstruct the helpful, forward-looking nature of the substantive guides for con-
temporary China that liberalism offers. Because communitarian views are merely 
critical and theoretical, adopting them “may easily come to serve as a basis for 
regression, effacing the individual and returning to a previous era” (Li 2011, 28).
Humans as ends, taken on a pragmatic and historicist basis, presents an imper-
ative to develop social and political norms and institutions that foster individual 
pursuit of interests and prosperity and thereby also associative flourishing. This 
shifts social norms from a pre-modern orientation in which the individual is seen 
as serving the group (collective or common interests) to a modern orientation of 
norms and institutions serving the individual and individual interests (or common 
interests reconceived as collective interests of disparate individuals, rather than 
interests of a shared group identity) (ibid., 32). This modern individualism and the 
norms protecting and promoting it “are important aspects of the future prospects 
of humankind,” and thus, “The theory of self in my own ethics is a form of histor-
icism that sees movement from the ‘greater self ’ (dawo 大我) to the ‘smaller self ’ 
(xiaowo 小我)” (Li 2017, §4). 
Li here does not merely affirm liberalism on historicist grounds (indeed, this would 
not differ significantly from later Rawls). He revises (or in his words, “transcends”) 
liberalism to embrace emotions and relations. Liberalism takes individualism too 
far in attempting to rationally derive normative principles from a conception of 
transcendental or unencumbered individuals, and Li’s ethics in response empha-
sizes “relationism” (guanxi zhuyi 關係主義) and the importance of emotions as 
feelings of human interconnection (Li 2016, 1080). The moral importance of 
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emotions and relations are core tenets of Li Zehou’s ethical theory, which he 
derives from classical Confucianism and places in opposition to liberalism’s em-
phasis on reason and individualism. In promoting his ethics, Li is on these issues 
a trenchant critic of liberal ethical theory. Yet he gives priority to liberal principles 
because his historical outlook finds them to be necessary, beneficial, or desirable 
as social and political norms for contemporary Chinese society. 
Li thus finds individualism to support human flourishing as it is increasingly em-
braced across developing societies, as evidenced by the fact that “these new social 
morals seem to generally win out and continue to break into diverse regions, peo-
ples, and cultures” (Li 2011, 24), and believes a properly redressed individualism, 
a relationally and emotionally understood valuing of the individual, will better 
support human flourishing. Li affirms the spread of liberal individualism and its 
liberating capitalist and democratic institutions, which include human rights, 
freedoms, and political neutrality, to be a moral imperative for modern society. 
This makes Li something of a liberal, in his own way:
The liberalism that I endorse (in which the totality exists for the indi-
vidual and individual rights have priority) is an aspect of my histori-
cism. That is, it is a requirement or product of historical development 
of a certain period or stage. In this way liberalism is part of historicism, 
and history does not end with capitalist society and liberalism. This 
both emphasizes [liberal] justice as well as takes the “emotional cos-
mology” of [my] idea that “harmony is higher than justice” as regulative 
in order to move toward a more ideal future. This transcends liberalism. 
(Li 2016, 1136)
This is the form of ‘liberalism’ that I advocate: promoting modern con-
cepts as the foundation for erecting future human psychology, and 
through education gradually both preserving and reforming tradition’s 
deep emotio-rational structures. (Li 2018, 224)
So how does he marry his affirmation of liberal principles to his ardent promo-
tion of Confucian morality, and especially its emphasis on relations and emo-
tions, in opposition to the emphasis on reason and individualism in liberal moral 
and ethical theory?
In endorsing the value and authority of liberal principles for Chinese society, Li 
argues that traditional Chinese morality is necessary to redressing liberalism’s the-
oretical and practical problems, especially in developing the application of liberal 
principles for Chinese society. 
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[L]iberalism such as that of Rawls’ notions of “the difference principle” 
(A Theory of Justice), “overlapping consensus” (Political Liberalism), and 
“the priority of the right over the good” is exactly what China needs 
today. But China should also be careful to avoid being overwhelmed by 
immensely rational economic and political mechanisms. This is the im-
portance of the corrective value of traditional Chinese notions such as 
“the way begins in emotions” and guanxi-ist relationality, which can serve 
as the “regulative and properly constitutive” principle for these rational 
mechanisms. (Li 2016, 1139)
The conclusion of repeated disputes over the last century is quite clear: 
modern Western rule of law must be adopted, and traditional ritual 
and law’s use of ordered relations in place of law, or of interpersonal 
emotions in place of reason, must be abandoned. ... However, since the 
gradually formed ideas and customs, and emotio-rational structure, of 
society cannot be simply and suddenly done away with, conceptions of 
modern rule of law exhibit certain conflict with the actuality of modern 
Chinese life ... (Li 2018, 206)
Independent liberal principles and traditional Confucian morals should be seen as 
distinct but also compatible types of morality.
Although I do not agree with foundationalist liberal theories, from no-
tions of natural human rights to the veil of ignorance, I nevertheless see 
great value in the modern morals and laws proposed and advocated by 
liberalism that take the individual as fundamental. I also emphasize the 
special importance of establishing these within China’s shamanistic his-
torical tradition [See Li Zehou 2018], and therefore argue that we must 
first differentiate between the two types of morals (traditional religious 
morals and modern social morals). (Li 2011, 29)
Li offers his own theory as a means of differentiating, and then reconnecting, 
these two types of morals. 
Li Zehou’s Theory of Two Morals
Li Zehou’s theory of two morals (liang de lun 两德論) advocates the distinc-
tion of modern social morals (xiandai shehuixing daode 现代社會性道德) from 
traditional religious morals (chuantong zongjiaoxing daode 傳統宗教性道德). Li 
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defines social morals as “the common principles, norms, order, values, and modes 
of behavior on which the maintenance of modern life relies, and include liberty, 
equality, human rights, democracy, and so on”; religious morals, in contrast, consist 
in beliefs and emotions “concerning the individual’s ultimate concern and the ide-
al of placing oneself at ease and establishing one’s fate” (Li 2018, 209). The former 
constitute a normative ethics, whereas the latter have to do with personal virtue. 
Li advocates modern social morals more or less equivalent to liberal norms—eth-
ical norms that “strive for liberty, equality, and human rights”—and traditional 
religious morals constituted by Confucian commitments that value relations of 
“familial compassion, caring, and concern for others” (ibid.). 
Li’s distinction is largely equivalent to Rawls’s differentiation of the principles of 
justice, as the right (or political norms governing the basic structure of society), 
from comprehensive doctrines of the good. Li also prioritizes modern social mor-
als in a manner comparable to the priority that Rawls grants to the principles of 
justice, making them indefeasible by considerations of traditional religious morals. 
Moreover, “Like Rawls’ position, my prioritization of this distinction attempts to 
avoid the so-called clash of tradition and modernization” (Li 2016, 1133). That 
is, Li’s distinction aims to reconcile the two, to establish a stable relation between 
liberal principles and traditional values.
Yet while Li’s two morals parallel Rawls, the grounds of his distinction and the re-
lation he establishes between them differ from Rawls in important ways. Accord-
ing to Li, originally the former was enveloped within, or determined by, the latter, 
so that traditional Confucian religious ethics subsumed social morals. Pre-mod-
ern Chinese political norms and institutions combined Confucianism with (tra-
ditional Chinese) Legalism, resulting in a “tripartite unity of religion, politics, and 
ethics” that led social morals to be heavily determined by overly hierarchical and 
often oppressive forms of human relations. Li believes that China has not entirely 
left this behind, but ought to, and intends his theory of two morals to deconstruct 
this tripartite unity. In line with his emphasis on historical particularity, Li’s argu-
ment for prioritizing liberal principles is thus fittingly historical: traditional Chi-
nese norms and institutions were relatively more oppressive due to an over-reli-
ance on existing concrete forms of human relations, so prioritizing rational liberal 
principles helps liberate subjects from such oppression and promote conditions of 
human flourishing through rational and individualist rule of law (Li 2018, 210). 
The corresponding institutions of rights and freedoms are relative goods, and their 
relative benefits are the grounds for affirming liberal principles in modern society.
Moreover, while modern social morals are distinct from traditional religious mor-
als, they cannot be fully independent of them (Li 2011, 31). Li emphasizes the 
need for this reconnection (once they are differentiated), since “The complete 
entanglement of the two kinds of morality penetrates groups and individuals, 
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which is both necessary and natural” (Li 2011, 32). In terms of the form of this 
reconnection, he advocates giving traditional religious morals—that is, the deep 
structures of Confucian morality prevalent in Chinese society—a “regulative and 
properly constitutive” (fandao he shidang goujian 範導與適當構建) function in re-
lation to modern social morals.2 Whereas Rawls maintains the independence and 
inviolability of the right in relation to the good, denying comprehensive doctrines 
any constitutive role in relation to political conceptions of the right, Li proposes 
substantive connections between them, making religious morals both “proper-
ly”—that is, in a limited capacity—constitutive of social morals and also allowing 
traditional morals to shape the application of liberal principles within society.  
These are relatively abstract statements. Li gives a more concrete and illustrative 
sense of what he means in arguing that China must “absorb modern liberalism as 
a criterion for contemporary legislation” (Li 2018, 209) while also advocating that 
legal suit should be a final recourse in China, following more personal forms of 
mediation, in line with a Confucian emphasis on harmonious personal relations. 
He cites China’s “people’s mediation system” (renmin tiaojie zhidu 人民調解制度) 
and local residents committees (jumin weiyuanhui 居民委員會) as preliminary 
models for how this might work (Li 2016, 1110, 1134; 2018, 202–10, 226–27, 
249–50; cf. 2008, 46).
Li describes traditional culture’s “regulative and properly constitutive” but not de-
terminative role in relation to basic rights as the “permeation, influence, and func-
tioning of substantive justice within formal justice” (Li 2016, 1134), and refers to 
its practice as “political art” or “the art of government” (zhengzhi yishu 政治藝術) 
(ibid., 1091, 1133). It is equivalent to the art of assessing “proper measure” (du 
度) in navigating concrete situations, and to the traditional Confucian concept 
of “flexibility” (quan 權), and also involves the skill of “conforming to emotions 
as well as reason” (heli heqing 合理合情) rather than inflexible application of nor-
mative principles (Li 2012, 107; 2016, 1091–92, 1119).3 Here Li emphasizes the 
integration of emotion with rational judgment:
To borrow a phrase from Chairman Mao, there is no love or hate with-
out cause or reason. Emotional aspects of human existence can certainly 
be described and examined through rational analysis. At the same time, 
through factual description and explanation, emotions can not only affect 
2 While Li sometimes denies the constitutive function of religious morals in relation to social 
morals entirely (i.e. Li 2018, 210; 2011, 32), he seems to mean this as a declaration of the formal 
independence of the latter from the former, in terms of its priority.
3 “Thus, the art of grasping ‘proper measure’ in recognizing the complex relationship between these 
two kinds of morals and in concrete analysis of particular situations is shown clearly to be of special 
importance.” (Li 2011, 32)
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but also even convince people of things. That is to say, emotions have 
causes or reasons, and “conformance” to them also has a certain rationally 
understandable pattern. … Confucius talked about ritual throughout his 
life, and yet while he repeatedly criticized Guan Zhong 管仲 for “not 
knowing ritual”, Confucius nevertheless lauded his overall virtue (ren 仁). 
This is a classic illustration of how we might carry out “flexibility” (not 
adhering blindly to the established rules of ritual) through “conformance 
with emotions”. Here we find that reason is ... connected with patterns of 
emotionality, as well. (Li 2016, 1119)
Thus, Li advocates a Confucian sense of morality or virtue that involves not mere-
ly the governance of reason over emotions in the sense of following rational rules 
of conduct, but also responsiveness to emotions in (rational) moral evaluation. 
The moral guidance of rational principles has to adapt to the particular values and 
emotional relations that constitute a moral situation.
In this sense, Li establishes a moral need to be responsive to the concrete emo-
tional relations of substantively Confucian societies in applying rational prin-
ciples of modern social morals (as liberal norms). Li’s theory of two morals in 
this way embraces and promotes the deep structures of Confucianism, which 
substantively shape the relations of Confucian society, and which can guide pro-
active social policies exhibiting “concern for the people”; but he also limits their 
role to directing action on the level of individual decision-making, “which must 
be differentiated from the ‘social morals’ (public virtue) to which people are to 
commonly adhere” (Li 2018, 224; cf. 2011, 26). In this way the personal values 
and beliefs of traditional religious morals have a regulative function in the ap-
plication of modern social morals, but are only properly constitutive, that is, not 
constitutive in a manner able to themselves revise or re-determine the content of 
modern social morals. 
Here we note two roles that Confucianism takes up in Li’s theory: firstly, as the 
deep structures of traditional Chinese values and beliefs that continue to con-
stitute the moral character of Chinese culture, and secondly, as part of his own 
moral theory, which repurposes Confucian moral teachings to serve as a means of 
affirming both traditional Chinese culture and modern liberal norms. The histor-
icism identified above as the grounds for affirming liberal principles for modern 
society itself requires a moral foundation, and Li provides this through the moral 
theory he develops from classical Confucian teachings. Herein, the ultimate ax-
iological foundation is the continuous extension of human existence (renlei de 
shengcun yanxu 人類的生存延續) (as communities and societies).
Li argues that there is an absolute grounding for substantive moral judgment in 
the historical process of the “sedimentation” (jidian 積澱) of human knowledge, 
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culture, and reason. Morality and reason are regulated by the conditions of hu-
man progress wherein goodness and badness can be objectively determined (Li 
2016, 1120–21). Li thus writes, “Ethics is attendant on history” (Li 2011, 6), and 
denounces relativism, despite endorsing the relativity of good and evil and right 
and wrong. The grounds for this absoluteness lie in the concrete needs of hu-
mankind—what Li refers to as “the extension of the life of the integrated totality 
(zongti 總體) of humankind past, present, and future” (ibid., 8). While the par-
ticular norms of specific societies may differ, morality retains ultimate grounding 
in the interests of greater humanity. Such grounding allows specific moral prin-
ciples to be absolute imperatives without requiring the existence of universal and 
eternally applicable prescriptions or proscriptions.
Li grounds the importance of proper measure in the need to adapt to the con-
stantly changing historical conditions in which humans live, which he describes as 
the “activity of continuously grasping precisely what is best as it constantly chang-
es” and which “thereby allows the community and the individual to continuously 
expand their living existence” (Li 2018, 268–69). Li identifies these views and val-
ues with the traditional beliefs and values of Chinese culture, and specifically with 
their embrace of the constant processes of change through which the continuous 
generativity of the world and humanity—of their production and reproduction 
(shengsheng 生生)—takes place. It is precisely this value on which Li’s historicism 
affirms both traditional and modern social morals. Li writes:
I am a historicist. I see all of ethics and morals, including justice, as serv-
ing the continuous extension of human existence ... (as communities and 
societies) and understand justice as coming not from rational agreement 
between individuals but rather from the concrete historical circumstanc-
es of communal existence, including shared emotional experience (Li 
2016, 1076).
Li argues that Confucianism prioritizes this value of production and reproduc-
tion, which occurs through diverse forms of natural and social human interrela-
tion, which in turn produce moral norms and duties (ibid., 1096). These gener-
ative, reproductive relations are unequal (in various senses) and emotional. They 
are also structured by rational norms and are the source of meaning and value in 
human life (ibid.). 
In this way, his ethical theory combines the grounds of traditional Chinese morals 
and modern liberal morals in his own interpretation of classical Confucian moral 
theory, which emphasizes morality’s complex integration of emotion and reason 
and the fundamental role of the concrete situatedness of human experience. 
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I view the formation or origin of the principles of justice through classi-
cal Confucian ideas such as that “rituals are generated from emotionali-
ty,” “the way begins in emotionality,” and “rituals are such due to human 
emotionality,” all of which are found among the Guodian bamboo slips. 
(Li 2016, 1076)
In my reading of Li’s ethics and political philosophy, then, humanity’s concrete, 
continuous production and reproduction is the sole axiological foundation—the 
single normative assumption and source of normativity. That is to say, Li derives 
the moral force of his ethics from the value of human flourishing, in its continu-
ously shifting historically relative forms. 
Since production and reproduction consist in or occur only through concrete rela-
tions, the human values grounded in them are always situated and the substantive 
norms they generate always situationally particular; correspondingly, since par-
ticular human values are grounded in the more fundamental value of life produc-
ing life, their relativity takes on an absoluteness within these concrete empirical 
bounds. Thus, for Li, relativity is not relativism, so to speak. Li creates space for 
both relativity and objectivity by bounding the absolute value of human produc-
tion and reproduction in the concrete forms of human relations through which it 
arises. This grounds liberal principles in a simpler and more stable axiology, with 
the help of historicism, than the more abstract formulations of, say, Rawlsian con-
structivism, or even the axiological (quasi-religious) assumptions of, say, Dwork-
inian human dignity. It also affirms these principles for modern Chinese society 
without the need to replace deeply embedded traditional values—the substantive 
moral character of Chinese society—with an imported value system. Li rather 
allows for Confucian morality to serve as the basis for affirming both traditional 
religious (comprehensive) morals and modern (liberal) social morals. 
Li thus overcomes liberalism’s internal contradiction—requiring hegemony in the 
name of self-determination—in two ways. He manages to endorse liberal principles 
without relying on foundationalist presumption of the value of liberty or freedom, as 
individual and collective self-determination, and he achieves a means of endorsing 
modern liberal social and political institutions in terms of values that Chinese citi-
zens themselves hold. In the former, he avoids certain common but philosophically 
unstable axiological presumptions. In the latter he achieves a valuable means of 
connecting modern institutions to traditional values for Chinese societies. 
Post-Liberalism
Li Zehou’s affirmation of liberal principles, then, is embedded within—and even 
arrived at through—a deep critique of the liberal moral views through which 
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these principles arose and on which they continue to rest, however flimsy they 
may be in those forms. Li presents his own Confucian moral theory, on which 
he affirms liberal principles for modern society, in opposition to liberal mor-
al theory, rejecting liberalism’s overemphasis on reason and individualism and 
arguing for the more substantive and even foundational role of emotions and 
concrete interrelation present in classical Confucian morality. The production 
and reproduction of human flourishing through these relations are the ultimate 
grounds of this morality. 
Concrete production and reproduction of human flourishing is also the basis on 
which John Gray ultimately affirms a non-foundationalist version of liberalism, 
which he refers to as “post-liberalism”. The post-liberal denies liberal orders’ “uni-
versal or apodictic authority”, in contrast to the foundationalism of most or all 
liberal political philosophy (Gray 1993, 284). He sees liberal doctrines as futile 
attempts to establish the universal authority of culturally and historically particu-
lar liberal practices (ibid., 246), and although he recognizes that some contem-
porary liberals merely aim at articulating principles of liberal democratic society 
and claim no such universalism, including Joel Feinberg, Richard Flathman, and 
Joseph Raz as well as Rawls in his later work (Gray 1989, 266n35; 1993, 243, 
246),4 Gray rejects even these views as doctrinal, arguing that their failure to pro-
vide sound philosophical grounds for liberal principles evidences the impossibility 
of the task. 
Gray identifies and pronounces the doctrinal death of four constitutive elements 
of liberalism: universalism, individualism, egalitarianism and meliorism (Gray 
1993, 284––313), and argues that following this doctrinal death, what remains 
alive of liberalism “is the historic inheritance ... of a civil society whose institutions 
protect liberty and permit civil peace” (ibid., 284). Gray then re-affirms all four 
constitutive features of liberal doctrine, but “in a contextual form” as qualities of 
civil society (ibid., 319–20). It is civil society, the institutions and principles of 
which can take various and unfixed forms, that “both history and theory show to 
be the precondition of prosperity and liberty in the modern world” (ibid., 246). 
On the value of prosperity and liberty, Gray affirms the value of liberal institutions 
that serve as their precondition.
Gray, moreover, rejects presumption of—or what he calls “presumptivism” about—
the value of liberty, arguing that it constitutes a widespread weakness of liberal 
theory. Instead, the value of liberty is, like other liberal principles and institu-
tions, derivative of its role as an empirical condition of human flourishing. Gray 
4 Gray references specifically Feinberg’s The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, 1984), Flathman’s The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
and Raz’s The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1988).
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correspondingly rejects definitional or conceptual analysis of freedom per se, in-
stead presenting himself as a theorist of concrete and historical practices of liberty. 
Freedom is on this account constituted by the practices of civil society, 
which it is the task of the theorist to illuminate. Any such understanding 
of the practice of liberty is bound to be an historical understanding––one 
that conceives of civil society as an historical artefact––but one that, in 
the context of the condition of late modernity (or early post-modernity) 
offers the best, if not the only prospect for the reproduction of civilized 
life. (Gray 1993, 318–19, emphasis in original)
The practice of liberty animates civil society (ibid., 284), and it is only through 
civil society that “a modern civilization can reproduce itself ” (ibid., 246). Avoiding 
axiological (and in his view, axiomatic) reliance on a presumed value of liberty and 
of liberal principles and institutions as they developed in historically particular 
Western tradition, Gray rests his endorsement of these on their empirical role as 
conditions of human flourishing in modern society.
Like Li Zehou, then, Gray rejects liberal theory but then reaffirms liberal prin-
ciples and institutions on the grounds of their concrete function in promoting 
continuous human flourishing in modern society. He rejects the a priori norma-
tive force of these principles, arguing that instead they instead they should be 
“contextualized and historicized as features of late modern (or early post-mod-
ern) societies and polities” (ibid., 284), and correspondingly ridicules the common 
presumption that political and social institutions as they developed in the West 
constitute ideal universal models.5 Yet he finds alternative grounds for the nor-
mative force of liberal principles and institutions in their pragmatic effectiveness 
in producing and reproducing human flourishing. Moreover, since liberal civil 
society seems to, empirically speaking, possess universal value and even necessity 
in (best) fostering human flourishing through protecting free and secure personal 
and associational pursuit of interests, “all, or nearly all forms of government that 
allow for commodious living will in the foreseeable future be ones that shelter 
the institutions of civil society” (ibid.). Thus, also in line with Li, Gray affirms 
(non-doctrinal) universalism and (non-teleological) perfectionism: it is liberal 
civil society, and not liberal democracy, that will ultimately win over human alle-
giances across cultures and regimes (ibid., 246). 
5 There is no universal ideal form of government, since regimes of many forms may protect the 
relevant institutions of civil society, as “a society in which most institutions, though protected by 
law, are independent of the state”, with an emphasis on institutions that foster free and secure 
personal and associational pursuit of interests, such as “private property and contractual liberty 
under rule of law” (Gray 1993, 246).
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Gray’s post-liberal affirmation of liberal principles is achieved in slightly differ-
ent terms than Li Zehou’s, resting heavily on empirical pluralism rather than 
an emphasis on emotions and concrete relations: “a liberal civil society is the 
best one for cultures, such as all or virtually all contemporary cultures, which 
harbor a diversity of incommensurable conceptions of the good” (ibid., 284). 
Yet as seen above, Gray also relies heavily on relationality in affirming this plu-
ralism, as where he writes that “human nature is always entirely constituted by 
a nexus of historically variant, culturally specific and alterable social relations” 
and that therefore “the forms of man’s life are the creations of his own practice, 
constrained only by the facts of his constitution and by the circumstances he 
inherits from his forebears” (Gray 1989, 35). 
While Gray, like other liberals, tends to avoid discussion of the moral importance 
of emotions, this may be implicit to, or at least necessarily implied by, his theory 
as well. Emotions are important, not only as part of these facts of human constitu-
tion and circumstance, but also in being essential to any concrete measurement of 
human flourishing. This is a point generally emphasized in Confucian teachings 
but often obscured in the rationalist discourse favoured by many contemporary 
Anglo-American theorists, who subsume the moral importance of emotions into 
moral “reasons,” which are constituted by factual conditions of human circum-
stance (including the emotional elements therein), and who describe the affective 
force of these reasons in accounting for moral motivation as, for example, their 
(rational) “moral importance” (i.e. Parfit 2002, 310–12; Scanlon 2014, 5–7, 86–90). 
The dangers of a purely rationalistic reliance on moral principles, without valuing 
people’s emotions, is a major theme developed from the Confucian classics and 
emphasized by late-imperial Chinese Confucian thought. Qing-dynasty Confu-
cian scholar Dai Zhen writes, for example, that disregard for human emotions 
in dealing with affairs leads to harming individuals, and even the state and all 
under heaven, because those referencing moral principles separate from human 
emotions and desires then elevate arbitrarily determined, abstract principles above 
concrete considerations of human suffering. This fails to recognize the importance 
of that suffering in determining what is right and wrong:
When they see people crying out from hunger and cold, men and wom-
en wailing because of the injustice done to them, and even those on the 
verge of death still desperately hoping to live, they claim these are no 
more than human desires, point blankly to a thing [i.e., pseudo moral 
principle] devoid of feelings and desires, and claim that this is the origi-
nal state of heavenly principle, preserved in their heart-minds. (Dai 1961, 
§40; Chin and Freeman 1990, 165)
AS_2020_1_FINAL_FINAL.indd   163 9.1.2020   11:44:22
164 Robert Anthony Carleo III: Confucian Post-Liberalism
Dai Zhen advocates an interpretation of classical Confucian teachings that em-
beds moral principles in the concrete patterns of human interrelation, the emo-
tional dimensions of which must be studied in order to determine right and 
wrong, which are themselves axiologically grounded in the fundamental value of 
production and reproduction (shengsheng 生生) in human life. This pointed crit-
icism of rationalism not only aligns with Li Zehou’s arguments, but also impor-
tantly buttresses post-liberalism’s anti-foundationalism more generally.
Thus, Li Zehou’s rejection of the doctrinal universalism of foundationalist liberal 
theories accompanies a Confucian affirmation of liberal principles on “post-liber-
al” and Confucian grounds. Ultimately, post-liberalism—at least in East Asia, but 
likely beyond—may prove not only aligned with but, in its most philosophically 
robust form, also largely substantively indistinguishable from such a version of 
Confucian liberalism. Or viewed in the opposite direction, civil society governed 
by liberal principles may best allow, at least today, for a prevailing of the Confu-
cian Way. 
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